Objective-To describe the extracontractual referrals of residents of Merton and Sutton Health Authority during the first three months of the NHS reforms in terms of the nature of the referral (elective or emergency), the specialty referred to, and the source of and reason for referral.
Introduction
With the introduction of contracting for health care as part of the NHS reforms,' special arrangements have been made for patients who require treatment outside the contracts arranged by their health authority. A mechanism has been devised for extracontractual referral to permit flexibility of referral by general practitioners and to allow for patients needing emergency inpatient treatment when they are away from home.' In comparison with the security and stability of block contracts, extracontractual referrals are unpredictable, in terms of both their number and their cost, and therefore cause considerable anxiety to purchasing authorities. In this paper we describe the extracontractual referrals of residents in Merton and Sutton Health Authority during the first three months of the new system.
Merton and Sutton are two outer, south London boroughs. There 
ELECTIVE EXTRACONTRACTUAL REFERRALS
The 109 requests for authorisation of elective extracontractual referrals were submitted by hospitals in 35 different health authorities in nine regions. Some requested retrospective authorisation for patients already admitted; some were for treatment in the months ahead. Forty referrals were for inpatient care; 13 for day care; and 56 for outpatient consultation.
More than half of all elective extracontractual referrals were to ear, nose, and throat; orthopaedic; or general surgery departments (table) . Nine referrals were made by dentists, two were made by sports medicine therapists, and three were tertiary referrals (a referral made bv a hospital consultant to another hospital where there is no contract). According to the authorisation request forms, the remaining 95 referrals were made by the patients' general practitioners, 79 of whom were local, eight were "fringe" practitioners with a proportion of Merton Requests for authorisation were received from distant provider units which identified Merton and Sutton residents on their waiting lists. These commonly involved orthopaedic patients, for whom there is traditionally a long waiting time, and of the first 30 requests for authorisation for elective treatment, 11 were for orthopaedic treatment, with eight of these for inpatient or day case care. This raises the question of whether there has been a selective culling of waiting lists with earlier admission of extracontractual patients whose treatment will attract additional payment. While there has been considerable publicity about the emergence of a two tier health service with shorter waiting times for the patients of fundholding general practitioners,5 little attention seems to have been paid to the possibility of double waiting lists-one for block contract patients and one for extracontractual patients.
Although emergency extracontractual referrals are theoretically simpler to deal with than elective ones, areas of concern have already emerged. Firstly, from the distant viewpoint of a purchasing authority, it is not possible to establish whether an emergency admission, which is income generating for the provider, was necessary or whether the case could have been dealt with equally well within the accident and emergency department. Already, the number of invoices received for emergency treatment is double the figure projected from analysis of previous years' activity. As an emergency admission may last less than a day but may cost more than £3800 some system of audit, perhaps carried out by the host health authority, may be necessary to protect public resources.
Secondly, there is the question of when emergency treatment, which can be carried out without prior authorisation, should be considered completed and gives way to elective treatment, which requires authorisation. A similar difficulty arises in relation to when an admission can be considered a readmission, requiring additional payment, and when it should be BMJ VOLUME 303 considered as part of the original episode of care. For example, should the health authority pay once, twice, or three times for a patient who was originally admitted as an emergency with pleurisy, then readmitted for bronchoscopy, then admitted again for a chest drain procedure -all within the space of one month? In such cases providers and purchasers are likely to have different perspectives.
It seems likely that dealing with extracontractual referrals will always take a disproportionate amount of time because it involves a large number of cases, each handled individually. With the new emphasis on the role of health authorities in promoting the health of populations, however, such referrals safeguard the rights of the individual against the rigidity of contracts that have been placed in the interest of the public health and provide a fascinating insight into the sociodynamics of referral patterns.
Introduction
The way that district health authorities react to requests for funding care in provider units not covered by a contract will determine whether money follows the patients or patients follow the money.
The government's view is quite clear. The general practitioner should be free to refer patients anywhere, secure in the knowledge that there is finance available. On the other hand, the district health authority is accountable for its expenditure and cannot merely reflect individual practitioners' wishes regardless of their effect on other patient services. The synthesis of these apparently contradictory statements means that patients can go where they like, but the health authority may not pay.
The government has made it clear that purchasing authorities should have firm contracts with all provider units offering a significant service to their resident population. This we have interpreted as a total workload of more than 50 inpatient or day cases (around £100 000) a year, or fewer if the average cost per case exceeds £20 000. In most districts this would mean tying up about 95% of the health authority's financial resource in contracts, leaving only a small amount for extracontractual referrals.
Financial issues
Extracontractual referrals fall into three main categories: emergencies, elective secondary care, and elective tertiary care. Little research has been done, but a general survey of our last three years' data suggests that roughly a half of all referrals will be emergencies and a quarter will be referrals for tertiary care. The prudent purchasing authority will divide its extracontractual referral contingency (around 5%) to reflect this; thus less than 2% of its financial resource is likely to be available to support non-emergency (or elective) referrals by general practitioners. This marginal amount removes from both the funding authority and the referring clinician the flexibility implicit in "the market." The manoeuvrability that does exist may well be progressively reduced as the larger contractors offer either a lower cost per case or an improved quality of care in return for an increased workload. Financial and managerial pressure will inevitably squeeze extracontractual referrals as time goes by.
Three other issues may effect the availability of funding for extracontractual referrals. The first is the statutory requirement that purchasing authorities pay the excess costs of hospital care arranged by any general practitioner fundholder when these exceed £5000 for any individual patient in any one year. The number of such cases is not yet known. Secondly, there is the need to consider possible spending on rehabilitation or continuing care, with community care being implemented in 1993. Thirdly, there is the whole question of overspending. The existence of an agreement or contract between a purchaser or provider does not mean that all health needs are automatically met. Although many contracts have banded workload targets to take account of fluctuations in demand, it is by no means impossible that there should be unexpectedly high workloads which cannot be diverted to other contractors and will require additional funds. Because these three extras will probably have to be met from district reserves, the district contingency needs to be divided into several categories, none of which will be large (box). BMJ 1991; 303:499-504 
